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THREE ROADS TO OPEN THEISM
Dale Tuggy
Open theists agree that God lacks what is normally called “comprehensive” 
foreknowledge, but why believe this? Open theists answer in three ways, 
which I call the narrow road, the wide road, and the shortcut to open the-
ism. Here I argue that (1) the narrow road faces a diﬃ  culty concerning the 
doctrine of divine omniscience which doesn’t arise for the wide road, (2) the 
wide road is well-motivated and appealing, given certain philosophical com-
mitments, (3) the shortcut is too simple to work, and (4) William Lane Craig’s 
objections to the wide road fail. I conclude with some observations about the 
state of the dispute between open theists and their critics. 
1. Three Roads, One Destination
Open theists agree that if God foreknew every detail of the future, then 
humans would lack signifi cant freedom.1 Believing in signifi cant free-
dom, they deny that God foreknows every last detail of the future. God 
is nonetheless, they insist, omniscient or all-knowing. But how can limits 
on foreknowledge be compatible with omniscience? Most open theists 
make one of three moves. They either (1) tinker with the defi nition of 
omniscience, (2) claim that at least some statements about future contin-
gents presently fail to be true or false, and so presently can’t be known, or 
(3) claim that all statements about future contingents are false.2 For rea-
sons I’ll explain below, I’m going to call these the (1) “narrow road,” (2) 
the “wide road,” and (3) “the shortcut” to open theism. The main thrust 
of my argument is that open theists ought to travel the wide road. Let’s 
examine these strategies in turn.
2. The Narrow Road: Hasker on Omniscience
In his book God, Time, and Knowledge and elsewhere, William Hasker builds 
a powerful philosophical case for open theism and against the traditional 
responses to the threat of theological fatalism. Most open theists are so for 
both biblical and philosophical reasons. While other open theists sweat 
over the details of biblical exegesis, Hasker does much of the philosophi-
cal heavy lift ing, and he does it clearly, concisely, and oft en convincingly. 
But there is an unsatisfying aspect of his narrow road to open theism.
Following convention, let’s call the traditional doctrine of foreknowl-
edge, whereby God knows every last detail of the future just as he 
completely knows the past and present, the doctrine of compre hensive 
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foreknowledge.3 Hasker, like all open theists, says that God lacks com-
prehensive foreknowledge, but is nonetheless omniscient. But as Hasker 
doesn’t claim that statements about future contingents presently fail to be 
true or false, in his view there will be an infi nity of truths of the form 
“Agent S will freely perform action A” which the omniscient God doesn’t 
presently know. How can this be? Hasker analyzes “God is omniscient” as 
meaning that “It is impossible that God should at any time believe what 
is false, or fail to know any true proposition such that his knowing that 
proposition at that time is logically possible.”4
On the face of it, this defi nition is too weak; it takes the “omni” out of 
“omniscience,” for according to it, an “omniscient” being can fail to know 
an infi nity of truths. Such a being may know a lot, we are inclined to say, but 
doesn’t know all, even though he may know more than any other being in 
existence, or perhaps even more than any other possible being could know. 
One can see why some of Hasker’s critics are given to complaints that he 
and other open theists “deny omniscience” or “deny foreknowledge.”
Hasker anticipates a variant of this objection as given by Jonathan 
Kvanvig and defends his analysis of omniscience using a comparison 
with omnipotence.5 If God is essentially morally perfect, then there will be 
logically possible actions he can’t perform, such as lying. Similarly, argues 
Hasker, there are “logical limitations” on what God can know.
Unfortunately, the cases are relevantly dissimilar. In one case, we have 
a bracingly clear logical incompatibility between two alleged features of 
God, namely omnipotence understood as the ability to do anything and 
essential moral goodness. But in the case of omniscience, where is the 
logical incompatibility? It is between omniscience understood (sensibly 
enough) as requiring knowledge of all truths, and our possession of sig-
nifi cant libertarian freedom. Here, the incompatibility doesn’t drop right 
out of the defi nitions; it needs arguing for. 
Of course, Hasker gives us arguments for the incompatibility, that is, 
arguments for what he calls theological incompatibilism.6 Three of these 
are apparently valid arguments from comprehensive divine foreknowl-
edge and a couple of other plausible principles to the conclusion that no 
human ever has libertarian freedom. Hasker’s point is that there seem to 
be only two premises one can plausibly deny, and he doggedly fi ghts oﬀ  
att empts to deny other premises, as well as assertions that nothing about 
the conclusion need disturb us. In the God, Time, and Knowledge version, 
the two premises are 
(B1) It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast 
tomorrow.
(B2) It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, 
or fail to believe anything that is true. (Premise: divine omni-
science)7
Hasker suggests that the best course is denying (B2), which he does by 
oﬀ ering his surprisingly weak defi nition of omniscience. He mentions in 
passing the option of denying (B1) instead, but doesn’t pursue it.8
William Lane Craig points out two problems with Hasker’s narrow 
road. First, as noted above, it’s hard to swallow that there are a huge 
number of truths that an omniscient being doesn’t know.9 The defi nition 
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appears, as Craig says, “unacceptably contrived.”10 I would add that like 
many compatibilist accounts of human freedom, it is made strictly to 
solve a philosophical problem, but carries no intrinsic plausibility.11 Can’t 
we have open theism and an intuitive defi nition of omniscience whereby 
such a being knows all truths? Yes, we can; that is the second, wider road 
to open theism, which we’ll examine shortly. Second, Craig observes that 
Hasker’s defi nition of omniscience “depends on there being a diﬀ erence 
between a truth and a truth that is logically possible to know.”12 But it’s 
hard to see what this extra requirement would be; it is hard to give “some 
reason to think that a statement can be true yet unknowable.”13 
In sum, Hasker’s opponents can be forgiven for holding out hope that 
his arguments for theological incompatibilism are somehow unsound. At 
best those arguments would establish that divine foreknowledge and lib-
ertarian freedom are logically incompatible, but they can never show why 
this incompatibility exists. That is, these arguments are unable to make 
the contradiction plain; they don’t help us gain an intuition of the relevant 
impossibility. This is a real shortcoming of the narrow road, and it doesn’t 
infect the wide road.
Consider another analogy, this time with the doctrine of divine omni-
presence. Suppose a philosopher claimed he could derive a contradiction 
between omnipresence and some hard to deny non-theological proposi-
tion. He might then revise the defi nition of omnipresence, saying that an 
omnipresent being is one which is everywhere, except in places where it 
isn’t logically possible for anything to be. We’d all reply that this philoso-
pher has rethought the issue of where God is, and to put it plainly, he 
denies that God is everywhere. There’s no use fi ddling with the defi nition 
of omnipresence, when what one asserts is that God is not everywhere 
(though he’s everywhere anything can be).14 A similar point applies to the 
narrow road; narrow roaders have an account of God’s knowledge, and 
according to it God knows vastly more than we do, but also according to 
it, there are some truths he doesn’t know. A plainspoken description of this 
position is that God is not all-knowing, though he has as much knowledge 
as any being could have.15 In other words, nothing could be omniscient, and 
so it is no hit against God that he isn’t. But I, and many other open theists, 
would shrink from saying that nothing could be omniscient. The claim 
that there are presently truths which are such that it is logically impossible 
that they be known now is hard to give content to. Happily, on the wide 
road to open theism, there is no reason to say these things.16
3. The Older and Wider Road
I call Hasker’s way “narrow” and this second way “wide” for two reasons. 
First, far more thinkers have taken the second road than have ever taken 
Hasker’s.17 Second, many thinkers have walked this path for reasons hav-
ing nothing to do with theism, much less with open theism. There are many 
well-developed responses to the concern about whether divine knowledge 
and human free will are compatible. The wide road has historical roots as 
deep and wide as any these. Also, it has enjoyed as many adept contem-
porary defenders as any. It is the only strategy which hasn’t received a 
thorough examination at Hasker’s hands.18 
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Philosophers and theologians who have traveled, or at least tempo-
rarily explored, the wide road include Aristotle, a fi ft h century Christian 
theologian, a few medieval philosophers, some Socinian theologians, 
several nineteenth century theologians, various process theologians, 
and many twentieth century standouts in logic and philosophy, such as 
Charles Hartshorne, Jan Lukasiewicz, Arthur Norman Prior, Richard
Taylor, Storrs McCall, Nuel Belnap, Palle Yourgrau, and Bas Van Fraasen.19
But enough with the honor roll. Most importantly, one can make a pow-
erful philosophical case for the idea that some claims about future contin-
gents presently fail to be either true or false. This is far from being an ad 
hoc expedient to rescue human freedom; the belief can be as fi rmly rooted 
in careful refl ection as competing views. Further, it seems strongly rooted 
in common sense; it refl ects the way that nearly all of us think about future 
and human freedom, at least before committ ing to some theory which im-
plies an incompatible view of time and/or free will.20
The wide road allows open theists to stay with a defi nition of omniscience 
which requires such a being to know all truths there are. Why is God’s fore-
knowledge limited? We needn’t give the controversial and unilluminating 
(though I think true) answer: because that would rule out humans having 
libertarian free will. Rather, it is limited because since some propositions 
about the future are presently neither true nor false, it is as of now impos-
sible that they be known to be true or false. It is best to say that divine fore-
knowledge isn’t limited at all, for there is never (and perhaps can’t be) any 
scrap of reality, on this theory, which is not included in God’s knowledge.
4. The Appeal of the Wide Road
The principle of bivalence says that all propositions are either true, or if 
not true then false. Here I want to briefl y sketch out the case for denying 
this principle for some statements about future events that as of now may 
or may not happen. My purpose is simply to display the powerful appeal 
of a certain way of understanding the cosmos and assertions about it. In 
section 6 below, I’ll argue that the complaints against the wide road by 
opponents of open theism don’t give us any reason to doubt its picture of 
freedom, truth, and time.
Certain elements of common sense, modern logic, modern physics, and 
a long western philosophical and theological tradition sanction a linear 
model of time. That is, past, present, and future can be properly modeled 
as in Figure 1.
v
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s
Figure 1
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The lett ers s through v are earlier and later times. The circular nodes are 
whatever is the case at a time, and the square node is the present—what is 
the case now. Due to the aforementioned factors, many philosophers consid-
er it blindingly obvious that there is and always has been an “actual world,” 
part of which has been, part of which now is, and part of which will be. 
An “actual world,” in standard terminology, is a certain “possible world,” 
which means that it is a certain logically consistent complete (spatially and 
temporally maximal) way things could be. And we should grant that com-
mon sense sanctions the belief that we all face a unique future, which could 
in principle be “viewed” by God or even a psychic.21 But common sense is 
not always consistent or clear; it also sanctions belief in incompatibilist or 
libertarian free will, as anyone who has taught an introduction to philoso-
phy class can att est. But belief in incompatibilist freedom logically requires 
the openness of the future.22 If an agent ever has an unconditional ability to 
respond to her circumstances in more than one way, then she faces an open 
future; she must at that time have more than one future accessible to her, as 
in Figure 2, which I’ll call the branching model of time.23
Philosophers who model reality in this way believe that time involves an 
ever-changing present, or objective time-fl ow, and are usually some sort of 
presentists, holding that the present has some sort of ontological priority 
over the past and future. Here I simply assume these controversial theses, 
because I think they are held by most open theists, and by many of their 
opponents as well. 
Why have a model of our temporal universe? Many or all of our claims 
concern our temporal cosmos, and we explicitly or implicitly utilize a 
model of it when making such judgments. Those who hold the linear 
model assign truth values from an omnitemporal or timeless perspective; 
any statement which is true at a time is, according to the model, true from 
the perspective of any time, or from the perspective of no time. Some even 
assert that they don’t know what it means to say that a claim is true at a 
time, and think it obvious that all true claims are so “timelessly.”
Assignment of truth-values is more complicated for those who hold the 
branching model. If the claim is about the present or past, the valuation 
is straightforward, for at the time the claim is about, reality (what is and 
what has been) either fi ts or misfi ts with the claim. But what about future 
claims? When one inspects “the future” on this model, we fi nd that there 
is no one future which is presently such that it will be; that is the whole 
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point of branches in the model. The branches don’t refl ect our ignorance, 
but rather model a feature of reality, namely, real, objective indeterminism 
in a dynamic universe.
In my view the present is primary. The past branch-segments are those 
which are now such that they were; the present evolved, so to speak, by 
way of them. As to the future branch-segments, we aren’t stuck with the 
incoherent thought that there are now “many (incompatible) futures.” 
(Were there to be a complete future there could only be one.) Rather, the 
branching structure beyond the present represents facts about the present, 
namely, outcomes which are possible given the course of history up till 
now. The branch-segments beyond the present represent temporally pos-
sible futures—not all the logically or even the causally possible ones, but 
rather, the ones which haven’t been ruled out by what has happened al-
ready together with what is now happening. These possible futures don’t 
exist in some weird realm, alternate universe, or half-way house between 
reality and unreality. They are simply present facts about the unrealized 
potentialities of present things; these things may change, be changed, give 
rise to new things, or be annihilated. The natures of things, in this model, 
allow more than one outcome. And if one believes in libertarian freedom 
in addition to indeterminism, one must add that which “path” or “branch” 
is taken is in some measure up to us. 
A couple of interesting things follow from this picture. First, there is at 
present no actual world! Rather, at most, there is now an ever-lengthening 
actual history-segment, comprising the past and present. In their enthusi-
asm for Leibnizian or Plantingian possible-worlds discourse, many philoso-
phers unwitt ingly commit to the linear model. On the branching model, one 
can reason about possible and impossible worlds, which would be maximal 
branches through the tree, but there won’t now be any actual world. Fur-
ther, if God essentially has libertarian freedom and necessarily exists, and 
time doesn’t end, there is at no time an actual world. And if it’s impossible 
that time ends, there couldn’t even be an actual world; the notion of actual 
world may, for all we know, be as impossible as a round square! 
Second, if the branching model is right, God didn’t sit back in eternity 
“before” creation, and decide which world to actualize, for there is no 
world which is in any sense timelessly or omnitemporally picked out. So 
however we think about providence, we branching model theorists can’t 
make use of the idea of God creating by actualizing a possible world. 
But most importantly, on the branching model of time there is now no 
future—no complete future world-segment or branch which is now such that 
it will be. As Gregory Boyd points out, this is compatible with there being 
some aspects of the future which are now going to be; there may be, as it 
were, a gappy, or partial future.24 It may be, for example, that no matt er which 
branch is taken, the living and the dead will be judged by Christ at 11:36 am 
on April 17, 2072. Or it may be that no matt er which branch is taken, the 
judgment will occur some time between Christmas of 2120 and Christmas of 
2121. Or it may be that no matt er which branch is taken, at some future time 
or other, the judgment will occur. Were these facts, they would be present 
facts about what will be, and would be known by the omniscient God.
It seems to drop out of this picture that some statements about things 
that as of now may or may not happen are neither true nor false (I say 
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“some” and not “all” because of an important distinction I’ll make in sec-
tion 5 below.) Will John have eggs for breakfast on a certain future morning? 
Picturesquely, we can take the “God’s-eye view” and mentally “climb up 
the crown of the tree” until we reach the morning in question, where we’ll 
observe that some branches there feature John having eggs for breakfast 
while others do not. Given the openness of the future in that respect, there 
is presently no fact which could make that statement true or false. Hence, it 
is neither, though since reality is ever-changing, it can later come to be true 
or false, say, that “John will have eggs for breakfast on October 12, 2039.”
Here we must consider a common objection. “Not so fast. What you’re 
saying is that if all futures accessible from the present feature John eating 
eggs for breakfast on October 12, 2039, then the aforementioned sentence 
is true. And if none of those accessible futures has that event, then the 
aforementioned statement is false. But you’re confused; you’ve given truth 
conditions not for ‘John will have eggs for breakfast on October 12, 2039,’ 
but rather for the corresponding modal statement—‘Now-unchangeably, 
John will have eggs for breakfast on October 12, 2039.’ But truth value is 
one thing, and modality is another. All it takes for the non-modal state-
ment to true or false is for the actual future to include, or not include John 
eating eggs for breakfast on that date.”25
In reply, if we assume that there is (timelessly, or now) an actual future, 
then this suggestion makes perfect sense. But this is to aﬃ  rm the linear 
model of time; there will be, at any time, exactly one accessible future 
(though there may be many other logically, causally, and epistemically 
possible futures). On the other hand, once we eschew commitment to a 
complete actual future, we are left  with a temporal universe that is pres-
ently (partially) indeterminate as to its current tendencies. We hold to the 
truth-realist intuitions that a true statement fi ts reality, and that a false 
statement misfi ts with reality. As of now, does reality fi t or misfi t with 
the claim that “John will have eggs for breakfast on October 12, 2039”? If 
that event occurs on all forward branches, then we have a fi t, so the non-
modal statement is true. If it occurs on no forward branches, then we have 
a misfi t, so the non-modal statement is false. If it occurs on some but not 
others, then as of now the non-modal statement lacks what it takes to true, 
and also lacks what it takes to be false as well.26 The objector is correct in 
her claim that truth is one thing, and modality is another, however, certain 
statements and the modal versions thereof may have the same truth-con-
ditions, as I’ll explain in section 5 below.
In sum, the wide roader’s denial of the principle of bivalence isn’t a 
mere ad hoc expedient to avoid fatalism or to confi rm some pet theory 
about God. It is based squarely on the sober considerations about truth 
in a dynamic world. The above should also put to rest the notion that any 
deniers of bivalence need the following silly non sequitur: because for we 
can’t know whether some statements about the future are true or false, 
such statements are neither true nor false.27
5. The Shortcut which Isn’t
Just as Hasker has up till now clearly taken the narrow road, so in previous 
publications open theist Gregory Boyd has clearly taken the wide road.28 
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Recently, however, inspired by some ideas of the master logician A. N. 
Prior,29 Boyd has backtracked and suggested a seemingly less radical way 
to open theism, which I’ll call the “shortcut” to open theism.30
Why, theological concerns aside, would the wide road be thought costly? 
There are at least the following three reasons. First, a denial of bivalence 
goes against our longstanding mainstream logical traditions. Bivalence is 
fed to every philosopher while she’s in her philosophical cradle (i.e., Intro-
duction to Deductive Logic class). Second, admitt ing that some claims are 
neither true nor false complicates one’s logic. For starters, inferring p from 
¬¬p will be a mistake if p is a kind of claim that can be neither true nor false 
(if p is not false, it needn’t therefore be true, for it could be neither). We’ll 
also wonder what to do with compound claims (e.g., p ⊃ q) where one of 
the component propositions is neither true nor false. Third, some believe 
that the notion that some claims are neither true nor false contradicts com-
mon sense, or is just somewhat unintuitive. 
In my view, the fi rst and third points are irrelevant, as popular practice 
and common sense can’t overturn philosophical considerations like those 
in section 4 above, especially since such considerations are butt ressed by 
other elements of common sense, such as belief in libertarian freedom and 
the openness of the future. The second fear is overblown, though much 
more needs to be said about it.31 I’ll argue here that the shortcut, though it 
satisfi es these three concerns and highlights an important point about talk 
of the future, doesn’t do what it is supposed to, and so is no alternative to 
the wide road. It is, sadly, a dead end and not a shortcut at all.
Suppose that Howard possess libertarian freedom to either scream or 
refrain from screaming. This freedom requires a partially open future, 
wherein some total branches passing through the present feature Howard 
screaming, and others do not. As there is no actual future, it is not presently 
a fact that Howard is going to scream. The situation is represented in Figure 
3. The lett er “p” here means the proposition that “Howard screams,” and 
time t is the present time.
Boyd and Prior argue that bivalence is safe, for while we can’t say that 
“Howard will scream” is true, we can say that it is false. The contradictory 
of “Howard will scream“ isn’t “Howard will not scream,” but rather, “It 
is not the case that Howard will scream.” In Prior’s notation, using “F” for 
“it will be the case that” and “p” for the present tense “Howard screams,” 
we have the following:
Figure 3
v
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¬pp
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False True
Fp ¬Fp
F¬p ¬F¬p
How so? We can read oﬀ  the above valuations using Figure 3 above. (In 
so doing we must assume that all p’s there are are represented here; that 
is, there are no other p’s “higher up” the “tree.”) Fp would be true just in 
case at the present, p was defi nitely going to be; that is, Fp would be true 
just in case all branches forward have p at some time or other (perhaps all 
at the same future time, perhaps not). But the future isn’t that way in the 
situation we’re supposing; there, p isn’t defi nitely going to be. Hence, Fp 
is false. The same considerations hold for F¬p, hence, it is false as well. 
Now ¬Fp says that it is not the case that p is now such that it is going to be, 
and this is true, for there is no actual future, and in no sense is p presently 
destined to come about. For similar reasons, ¬F¬p is true.
So far, so good. In my view, the preceding claims are true and impor-
tant. The payoﬀ  for preserving God’s omniscience and human freedom 
is obvious. God can’t know whether or not Howard will scream, because 
when that event is future and contingent (i.e., something which as of now 
may or may not happen), “Howard will scream” is false, for as of now his 
screaming is not going-to-be. Of course, God would know that “It will be 
that Howard screams” is false whenever it is, but that in no way threat-
ens Howard’s freedom to scream, as God’s knowing that doesn’t logically 
imply that Howard does, or that Howard does not scream at some future 
time. Problem solved, right? And no exception to bivalence is in sight.
Unfortunately for this elegant solution, the matt er is not so simple. Note 
that we’ve defi ned “Fp” as meaning “it is now defi nitely going to come 
about that p,” or “given the fl ow of time up till now, it is inevitable that p 
will happen.” “Fp,” so defi ned, makes an assertion about the future and the 
present. It asserts that p happens down the line, and also, the present is such 
that this will defi nitely happen; the objective probability of p happening at 
some future time or other is presently (and at all future times) 1. 
At this point, sophisticated Molinists, other opponents of open theism, 
and miscellaneous defenders of bivalence will cry “foul.” Their objection 
is important, as it shows what is lacking in the shortcut; let’s listen to their 
complaint: “When I say ‘It will be that Howard screams’ or ‘Howard is 
going to scream’, I just mean that at some future time Howard screams! 
I’m not claiming the event to be inevitable or now-unchangeable. What I 
say is true just in case, as time rolls on, Howard ever screams. My state-
ment is solely about the future, and is not also about the present.”32
There is something right and important in the objection. We can and do 
make assertions purely about the future which are neutral as to whether 
or not the named event is presently inevitable. Suppose a pundit predicts: 
“Hillary Clinton will be elected U.S. president in 2008,” and that this is 
something that at the time of the prediction may or may not happen. We 
must get beyond what the pundit says to discover what she means, what 
she’s asserting. Is she asserting that Hillary’s election is now inevitable, that 
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is, defi nitely going-to-be? She may be. If so, what she asserts is false, as 
Boyd argues. But she may not be asserting that. She may be assuming that 
the current probability of Hillary’s election is somewhat or very high. The 
one thing she can’t be presupposing (if her thoughts are consistent) is that 
its probability is now 0. And quite possibly, she’s never even considered 
the question of how probable Hillary’s future election is. But whatever her 
stance on the objective probability of Hillary’s election presently is, the 
pundit may simply be forecasting that eventually, Hillary’s election will 
happen. In this case, her statement is about some future time, and is not 
also about the present. In this way she can consistently say both “Hillary 
will be elected in 2008” and “As of now, Hillary’s election in 2008 may or 
may not occur.” On the assumption that Hillary’s election is indeed a future 
contingent, the second statement is presently true, though the fi rst state-
ment presently lacks a truth-value.
There are diﬀ erent tenses we can use in talking about the future. J. R. 
Lucas, following Hans Reichenbach, distinguishes between the “simple
future” and “posterior present” tenses. The English sentence “There will be 
a sea batt le tomorrow,” Lucas explains, can be understood in two ways. 
[T]he simple future speaks only about tomorrow, that it is a sea-batt le 
day, whereas the posterior present says something about today too, 
that it is a day-before-a-sea-batt le-day.33
Thus the assertion that Howard will scream can be understood as “At 
some future time or other, Howard screams” (simple future tense) or as 
“As of now, Howard will (defi nitely) scream.” (posterior present tense). 
The importance of this distinction is that when it comes to statements 
about future contingents in the posterior present tense, there is no need to 
deny bivalence, as all such claims are presently true or false, as Boyd and 
Prior argue. However, by the argument of section 4 above, we know that 
as of now, when p is a future contingent, reality doesn’t presently feature 
p happening or not happening in the future. Hence, both “it will be that p” 
and “it will be that ¬p” (simple future tense) are presently neither true nor 
false. The failure to distinguish between the simple and posterior present 
manifests in persistent confusion that ¬Fp and F¬p make the same asser-
tion.34 If we read “F” as simple future, these are logically equivalent. But 
reading the “F” as posterior present, it is clear that they mean diﬀ erent 
things, as explained above. 
In section 4 above I made the point that if one thinks of time as branch-
ing in the future direction, one must hold that some claims about the future 
are when made neither true nor false. I now clarify the point: this holds 
only when “it will be that p” is in the simple future tense. Statements in 
the posterior present tense are all either true or false when made. 
At the end of section 4, I raised the objection that I’m “confusing truth 
and modality.” To fully dismantle this objection, I’ll need to put all my 
cards on the table. I’ve argued that there are (at least) two distinct kinds 
of future-tensed statements, the simple future, and the posterior present. 
The statements have both non-modal (“it will be that p”) and modal (“nec-
essarily, it will be that p,” “possibly, it will be that p”) forms. The kind of 
modality is “now-unchangeability”: what must be, what can’t not be, given 
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the course of history up till and including the present. I now spell out what 
I understand the truth-conditions of all these kinds of statements are. 
Let’s use “Fp” for the posterior present, “Op” (it is eventually going to 
turn out that p) for the simple future, “ ” for “now-unchangeably,” and 
“◊” for “temporally possibly” (◊p means “it is not now-unchangeably the 
case that it is not the case that p,” that is, ¬ ¬p ). Such statements, like any 
statements, will be true, false, or neither because of how reality is. Future 
tensed statements are about “the future.” Will it be that p? If we consider 
all the “branches” through the present—that is, all possible total histories 
consistent with the fl ow of time so far—p must be related to them in one 
of three ways. Perhaps p occurs at some point on every branch. On the 
other hand, p may occur on no such branch. And fi nally, perhaps p occurs 
on some, but not on other branches.35 There are, then, three situations to 
consider, three ways that reality may relate to p—this event that we are 
saying will, won’t, or might happen. With these tools, we can specify the 
truth conditions for the various possible statements, and say which are 
logically equivalent to which. 
Logically 
equivalent 
statements
Situation 1: 
All accessible 
futures contain p, 
none contain ¬p
Situation 2:
No accessible 
futures
contain p,
all contain ¬p
Situation 3: 
Some accessible 
futures contain p, 
others ¬p
Fp, □Fp, ◊Fp,
□Op, ¬◊O¬p
T F F
¬Fp, ¬□Fp, ¬◊Fp,
¬□Op, ◊O¬p
F T T
F¬p, □F¬p, ◊F¬p,
□O¬p, ¬◊Op
F T F
¬F¬p, ¬□F¬p, ¬◊F¬p,
¬□O¬p, ◊Op
T F T
Op, ¬O¬p T F –
¬Op, O¬p F T –
All of this seems correct to me, and I invite the reader to consider each 
spot on this chart from the presupposition of the branching model of time. 
(With apologies to technically-minded readers, I can’t comment here on 
all the logical ins and outs of this sort of temporal and modal logic.)
Now the objector was accusing me of confusing “it will be that p” 
with “now-unchangeably, it will be that p”; it was alleged that I fool-
ishly oﬀ ered the truth-conditions of the latt er for those of the former. 
But I wasn’t confused. As I understand Fp, it is logically equivalent to 
Fp; whenever one is true, so is the other, and whenever one is false, so is 
the other. In general, depending on the modality and the claim, it can be 
that a claim and the modal version of it are true or false in all the same 
circumstances, and are made true by one and the same fact. For example, 
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one may know and assert that “No bachelor is married” without having 
any modal concepts. But presumably the same fact that makes it true also 
makes it true that “Of metaphysical (or logical) necessity, no bachelor is 
married” (namely, that the concept of a married bachelor is inconsistent). 
Back to the case at hand, one who says “it will be that p” (Fp) doesn’t as-
sert that same thing as one who says “now-unchangeably, it will be that 
p.” (□Fp) And a person may assert Fp without having any clear grasp of 
the concept of now-unchangeability (temporal necessity). Still, the fi rst 
claim is true just in case the second claim is true, and is false just in case 
the second is false. Again, Fp and □Op don’t mean the same thing, but 
they are logically equivalent.
The objector’s claim that “it will be that p” may be true while “now-
unchangeably, it will be that p” is false, is ambiguous. At fi rst glance, we 
might think there are four interpretations:
1. Fp may be true while □Fp is false.
2. Op may be true while □Op is false.
3. Fp may be true while □Op is false.
4. Op may be true while □Fp is false.
However, there aren’t really four interpretations; she’s asserting that a fu-
ture-tensed statement may be true while the modalized version of that same 
statement is false. Thus, she mustn’t mean 3 or 4. (For the record, both 3 and 
4 are false; see the table just above.) To assert 1 or 2 is pure question-begging 
in this context, for these are the very things wide road open theists deny. 
And importantly, their denial isn’t merely a clever escape from problems 
their own claims have generated; the denial of bivalence for non-modal 
simple future tensed statements, and all of the valuations on the chart are 
above, are based on sober, cool-headed intuitions about truth in an indeter-
ministic world—that is, a world “with a branching future,” irrespective of 
any pet theories about God or human freedom.
To return to Boyd and Prior, we’ve seen why the hoped-for shortcut 
to open theism is in fact a dead end. Open theists believe there are valid 
arguments from the doctrine of comprehensive foreknowledge to the non-
existence of signifi cant human freedom. Yet we maintain belief in such 
freedom by replying that such arguments are unsound, because each con-
tains a false premise, the one which says that God certainly foreknows 
some future free action. Boyd and Prior can block some such arguments 
(where what God knows is that some future free action is now going-to-
be), but not others (where God knows that some future free action will 
eventually occur). Here we must say that God doesn’t now know that, not 
because it is false (how could it be?) but rather because it is now neither 
true nor false. The shortcut isn’t; the wide road alone gets us where we 
want to go.
6. Craig’s Att empts to Close the Wide Road
Open theism has provoked a great deal of criticism from theologically 
conservative Christians, especially evangelical protestants. Among phi-
losophers, the able and prolifi c William Lane Craig has led the charge. 
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As we saw in section 2 above, he makes some apt criticisms of the narrow 
road. In this section I’ll reply to seven criticisms of the wide road in Craig’s 
writings; wide roaders, I believe, have solid replies to each one.
Objection 1: Open theists argue as follows: the future is unreal, only state-
ments about what is presently real can be true, hence statements about 
the future are untrue. But the second premise is false; if it were true, then 
claims about the past couldn’t be true or false either. That isn’t so; it is 
true, for instance, that “Abraham Lincoln was assassinated.” The truth of 
a claim about any time depends simply on what is the case at that time. 
If it will be, then the statement is true; ontological diﬀ erences between the 
present and future are irrelevant. Though an A-theory of time is correct, 
we can’t infer from it that the principle of bivalence is false.36
Reply 1: Let’s take the points in reverse order. It isn’t the A-theory alone 
which requires denying bivalence, it’s rather the branching model. It is 
false that the truth of any claim about any time depends simply on what is 
the case at that time. As we saw in section 5 above, this isn’t true of state-
ments in the posterior present tense.37 As to the argument at the beginning 
of the objection, open theists oft en express their intuitions imprecisely, in 
ways that are open to this interpretation (though in some cases charity 
arguably requires that they be understood as unclearly presupposing the 
branching model).38 All must agree that if something has been, it is now 
true to say that it was, and if it will be, it is now true to say that it will be. 
But the branching model has it that as to, say, Bill freely eating an apple in 
three days, neither the eating nor the not-eating is now such that it will be. 
One who asserts that the truth of a claim about any time depends simply 
on what is the case at that time seems to be using that “is” in a tenseless 
manner, referring to what is the case from a timeless or omnitemporal 
standpoint. But according to the branching model, when one takes the 
God’s-eye perspective, what one sees is a linear past and present capped 
oﬀ  with a branching realm of future possibilities; that is, the God’s-eye 
perspective reveals no total future, as there is presently no such thing. Nor 
will there ever be a total future, so long as time never ends and at least one 
being with libertarian freedom exists. Objection 1 thus fails as a diagnosis 
of why (at least some) open theists think as they do, and utt erly fails as a 
non-question-begging objection.
Objection 2: The “same facts that guarantee the truth or falsity of present- 
and past- tense statements also guarantee the truth or falsity of future-tense 
statements.”39 If on Christmas eve I say “there will be a white Christmas 
this year,” and the day aft er Christmas, I say, “we had a white Christmas 
this year,” there is one fact, namely snow on Christmas, that makes both 
true. That fact is simply being viewed from diﬀ erent temporal perspectives. 
But if one fact makes both true, how can we say that the fi rst statement is 
neither true nor false while the second statement is true?40
Reply 2: First, as the open theist allows that some statements about the 
future are true in advance, and to my knowledge no open theist claims 
that all statements about the future lack a truth-value, we need a diﬀ erent 
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example, one which clearly involves future contingents.41 Let’s suppose 
that Johnny freely decides to help with preparing Christmas dinner. Craig 
urges that in all cases, the “same facts guarantee that a future-tense state-
ment asserted earlier, a present-tense statement asserted simultaneously 
[with the fact it is about], and a past-tense statement asserted later are 
all true.”42 But we should ask: guarantee when? If the branching model 
is correct, we see that at times prior to Johnny’s free decision, there is no 
future fact to guarantee the truth of “Johnny will freely decide to help 
with preparing Christmas dinner.” There is such a fact during and aft er his 
decision, about what is or has been. Craig seems to be thinking that reality 
warrants looking at the matt er timelessly or omnitemporally. He simply 
doesn’t engage holders of the branching model here; he doesn’t even men-
tion the notion that it is mistaken to consider the future as being complete 
from the standpoint of eternity, or from a “God’s eye” view. 
Objection 3: The following argument refutes the claim that some propo-
sitions are at some times neither true nor false, but later become true or 
false.43
1. Any true tensed statement has a logically equivalent tenseless version.44 
2. Every true tenseless statement is true at all times.
3. Every true tensed statement is true at all times. 1, 2
4. No tensed statement gains a truth value aft er previously lacking one. 3
Reply 3: The argument is valid, but someone committ ed to the branching 
model ought not accept 2. If (the simple future) “Howard will scream next 
Thursday” is presently neither true nor false, for the same reasons “How-
ard screams on January 20, 2008” is presently neither true nor false.45 This 
latt er statement may well become true, but it doesn’t follow, for believers 
in branching time, that it always was true, because it wasn’t always going-
to-be. Craig asserts that “a tenseless statement, if it is true at all, is always 
true. This is precisely because the statement is tenseless.”46 But this infer-
ence can only be made by believers in an actual world—a complete world 
history, such that part of it has happened, part is happening now, and part 
is such that it will happen. This is precisely what wide roaders deny.
Another problem with this argument is premise 1. It seems that 
“Howard will scream next Thursday,” when understood as a posterior 
present statement (asserted when the next Thursday is 1/20/08), is not 
logically equivalent to “Howard screams on January 20, 2008.” The fi rst 
statement implies that today is such that it defi nitely will be followed 
by said scream on the next Thursday, whereas the timeless statement 
does not. (It could now be neither true nor false, subsequently becoming 
true on Wednesday night, for instance, in which case today won’t have 
been such that it defi nitely would be followed by that scream on the next 
Thursday.) So like premise 2, premise 1 should be rejected by proponents 
of the branching model. 
Objection 4: It is untenable that no future-tensed statement is true or false 
when it is made. If that were so, “the statement made in 1998 ‘George W. 
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Bush either will or will not win the presidential election in 2000’ would 
not be true.”47 But it was. Further, an open theist can’t say that “Bush will 
both win and not win the presidential election in 2000” was false in 1998, 
which of course it was.48 
Reply 4: Craig is arguing against a straw man. Open theists don’t want to 
make the absurd claim that no statement about the future is true or false. 
And open theists taking the wide road have ample grounds for agreeing 
with Craig that the fi rst statement above is true and the second false. For 
wide roaders, reality as it stood in 1998 was suﬃ  cient to make that state-
ment true, interpreted in the simple future tense. In all futures accessible 
from 1998, the election of 2000 either did or didn’t feature “Dubya” as 
the winner—even the possible future-segment which eventually became 
actual, in which the vote counting lasted into 2001. The English “or” state-
ment cited by Craig was thus true, but not because one of the disjuncts 
was true. It is not what logicians call truth-functional, and so it can be 
misleading to translate it into the fi rst order logic statement “p v ¬p.” But 
so what—all analytic philosophers know that there is an infi nity of non-
truth-functional statements or propositions which can’t be expressed in 
standard fi rst order logics, for instance, all truths involving necessity and 
possibility. What made the second statement false in 1998 (whether read as 
posterior present or simple future) was the fact that it was impossible for 
the future to turn out that way. There was no branch or branch segment on 
the tree in which “Dubya” wins and doesn’t win the election (in the same 
way and at the same time). That statement would be false not only in 1998, 
but also at all times before the completion of the 2000 election.
If one reads Craig’s statements as posterior present tensed, then on 
the assumption that Bush’s victory was as of 1998 something that might 
or might not happen, then both of the cited statements would be false in 
1998. “George W. Bush either will or will not win the presidential election in 
2000” would be false because neither his victory nor the non-occurrence of 
his victory was going-to-be as of 1998. “Bush will both win and not win the 
presidential election in 2000” is necessarily false if read as posterior present. 
It asserts, in eﬀ ect, that in 1998 the present had contradictory properties—
preceding and at the same time not preceding a Bush victory in 2000.
Objection 5: “[1] to assert that a proposition is false is to assert that it is not 
true and [2] to assert that it is not true is to assert that it is false; [3] to assert 
that a proposition is true is to assert that it is not false and [4] to assert that 
it is not false is to assert that it is true. Thus from the very meaning of the 
terms [‘true’ and ‘false’], it follows that every proposition is either true or 
false, which is the Principle of Bivalence.”49
Reply 5: Wide roaders must agree with 1 and 3. There is no reason for 
wide roaders to accept 2 or 4, and they have ample reason to deny 2 and 4, 
as explained in sections 4 and 5 above.
Objection 6: Prior and Boyd claim that a prediction like “Hillary will be 
elected president in 2008” is false when made, even supposing that when 
the time comes, she wins! That’s fl atly inconsistent.50
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Reply 6: The apparent inconsistency disappears when we observe the 
distinctions of section 5 above. It can be false that something is now 
going-to-be, even if it later becomes going-to-be and/or eventually hap-
pens. Craig’s comments in one place where he makes this objection are 
revealing: “this seems absurd, for what else does it mean for a future-
tense statement to be true than for things to turn out as the statement 
says they will?”51 It can mean, when the statement is posterior present, 
that things will turn out that way, and that the present is such that it will 
defi nitely evolve that way, so to speak. If the prediction is in the simple 
future tense, it is inconsistent to say that is now false though what it 
forecast later happens. As we’ve seen, wide roaders will say, plausibly, 
that such predictions are never true or false when made. Those who like 
Craig are committ ed to an actual world, with its linear future, won’t 
abide this, but this does nothing to close the wide road.
Objection 7: Susan Haack has proven that the principle of bivalence logi-
cally follows from two hard to deny principles, namely the law of excluded 
middle and Tarski’s truth schema. Therefore, we ought not deny bivalence.52 
The argument, which uses “Tp” for “It is true that p” and “Fp” for “It is 
false that p,” is as follows.
1. Tp ≡ p Tarski’s truth schema
2. p ∨ ¬p law of excluded middle
3. T¬p ≡ Fp defi nition of “F” (“It is false that ___”)
4. p assumption 
5. Tp 1, 4
6. Tp ∨ T¬p 5, ∨-introduction
7. ¬p assumption 
8. T¬p 1, 7, substituting ¬p for p
9. Tp ∨ T¬p 8, ∨-introduction
10. Tp ∨ T¬p 2, 4–6, 7–9, ∨-elimination (proof by cases)
11. Tp ∨ Fp 3, 1053
Reply 7: This argument is primarily directed against certain wide roaders 
who wish to aﬃ  rm the law of excluded middle (every sentence of the form 
p ∨ ¬p is true) while denying the principle of bivalence (every p is either 
true, or if not true, false). To many, this argument presents itself as an 
unassailable proof. I suggest that such people are in the grip of the linear 
model; that is, they are believers in an actual world. 
How so? Premise 1 takes on the sheen of a necessary and self-evident 
truth only if a linear model is assumed. Adherents of the linear model 
read it thusly: “It is timelessly or omnitemporally true that p if and only if it 
is timelessly or omnitemporally the case that p.” The actual world is (from a 
timeless and/or an omnitemporal perspective) what it is. And the eternal 
verities are about that world. Suppose, assuming this perspective, that a 
claim p is true. The answer to the question “When is p true?” never matt ers. 
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Some philosophers protest that they don’t understand what it would be 
for a claim to be true at or relative to a time. Others think it obvious that if 
p is true at some time t then it must be true at all other times as well. Both, 
I suggest, are assuming an actual world.
Whoever embraces the branching model must deny premise 1. Such a 
person accepts that the universe objectively changes, and hence that the 
stock of truths about that universe changes as well. There will then be an 
infi nity of counterexamples to 1 above, which pop up as soon as we ask, 
with the branching model in mind, when it is true that p. Suppose that p is 
“Hilary freely decides to run for president of the United States on January 
1, 2007.” Suppose that this date is in the past, and that p is now true—she 
did do that. We won’t say, though, for reasons given in section 4 above, that 
p was true in, say, 500 BCE, or even in 2004 CE.54 In this situation the left  
hand side of 1 is false, while the right hand side is true; thus, the bicondi-
tional 1 is false.55
In this section we’ve seen seven shots and seven misses. What lessons can 
we draw from all this? First, we should note that the linear model is a 
widely and deeply entrenched assumption. Many of its proponents feel 
no need to defend it, as it is seamlessly woven into their belief system, con-
necting with such issues as God, physics, and human freedom. This is just 
a sociological observation; nothing follows about the truth or rationality 
of the linear model. 
But it leads us to a second point. Once their assumption is plainly 
pointed out, labeled, and contrasted with an att ractive alternative, it is 
their job to both argue for it and defend it. It seems to me that opponents 
of open theism have not yet done this. 
The reason for this comes out in our third lesson: the failed objections 
above are mere distractions. The fundamental reason for traditionalists’ 
disavowal of the wide road (or any sort of open theism) has to do with 
what the mainstream Christian traditions have committ ed to, and specifi -
cally what they hold the Bible teaches.56 The traditionalists’ core conviction 
is that the mainstream Christian traditions have been correct to aﬃ  rm that 
God has comprehensive foreknowledge of history, because this is what is 
taught in the Bible, and everything the Bible teaches is true. Indeed, some 
of them think it is obviously taught in the Bible—something which any but 
the most stubbornly biased reader will fi nd there—which explains their 
frequent exasperation with and sometimes open contempt for open the-
ists. Yet this claim that comprehensive foreknowledge is an obvious biblical 
doctrine has been adequately refuted by open theists.57 
Whether or not the claim that God is omniscient but lacks comprehen-
sive foreknowledge is an acceptable, good, or overall best interpretation of 
the Bible is an ongoing discussion. One relevant consideration is whether 
or certain post-biblical traditions (take your pick) are normative for Chris-
tians. The normativity of post-biblical tradition is something that hasn’t 
been much discussed (possibly because it is a diﬃ  cult issue for conserva-
tive Protestants), and usually only comes up when traditionalists want to 
get in a few rhetorical jabs at open theism as faddish, based on ignorance 
of history, or a dangerous aberration. Certain post-biblical creeds assert 
things incompatible with open theism. Do its opponents consider these 
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documents authoritative for Christians, or not? If so, whence does their 
authority derive? It is no good to att empt to ridicule open theism for its 
admitt ed historical unpopularity; sometimes unpopular claims turn out 
to be true! 
We’ve seen that the objections of this section don’t work, nor do they 
get to what really divides open theists from their traditionalist critics. Even 
were all sides to acknowledge the failure of these objections, opponents of 
open theism would put all the weight of the issue on their claim that the 
Bible plainly teaches things incompatible with open theism. 
7. Conclusion
To summarize, the narrow road to open theism is unsatisfying because 
it forces us to concoct a suspect analysis of omniscience. In contrast, the 
wide road to open theism isn’t a mere expedient to solve a philosophical 
problem. It is rather based on a serious and well-articulated view of reality 
and an accompanying view of truth about that reality. This view can be 
given initial plausibility, and gains plausibility upon refl ection. It has not 
been eﬀ ectively argued against on philosophical grounds by open theism’s
opponents, who universally assume the linear model. The shortcut prom-
ises the same gain as the wide road with less pain, but can’t deliver.
Aft er all is said and done, what is the dispute about open theism fun-
damentally about? Is it, as some opponents stoutly object, a dangerous 
att empt to “redefi ne God” or to invent a new, non-biblical god in accor-
dance with contemporary tastes? Is open theism a lawless and confused 
abandonment of historic Christianity, or a foolhardy rejection of biblical 
authority? Or is it, as David Basinger argues, a disagreement about the 
nature of divine providence?58 
Travelers on the wide road should say the following. At bott om, we have 
not (merely) a disagreement about God, biblical interpretation, or the role 
of tradition in guiding theology; we rather have a deep disagreement about 
this question: Is there presently an actual world? Wide roaders say no, and 
their opponents say yes. Open theists have made the point before that the 
dispute is not about the fact of God’s omniscience, but rather the content of 
it, and the refl ections of sections 4–6 above show why some critics’ dismissal 
of this claim is cavalier.59 Many conservative theologians and philosophers, 
in their zeal to play Paul Revere (“The heretics are coming!”) are too quick 
to try to change the subject back to the att ributes of God or to the allegedly 
dire spiritual consequences of believing open theism, subjects about which 
they are more comfortable arguing. Too many of these critics are fi rmly and 
uncritically in the grip of the linear model, and seem unaware of the issues 
of sections 4–6 above.
Why doesn’t God know that you’ll freely eat Twinkies tomorrow? It is 
right to say, with Hasker, that since you have signifi cant free will, he can’t 
know that, but it is more illuminating to say that there is now no such 
truth about a coming Twinkie-eating to be known—because as of now, 
that event isn’t going to be. God at all times knows all there is, but “all 
there is” is a moving target.60
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NOTES
1. That is, I think, part of what most people mean by “open theism.”
David Basinger, however, holds that open theism is fundamentally an account 
of divine providence which is compatible with classical theories of divine 
foreknowledge (though he is an open theist who holds that God has what he 
calls “present knowledge” only). See his “Practical Implications,” in The Open-
ness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Clark 
Pinnock (et al.), (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p. 155, and The 
Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-
Varsity Press, 1996), pp. 36–7, 55, 144 n.23.
2. In some cases, open theists employing the second strategy speak of a 
need to redefi ne the concept of omniscience, not realizing, I think, that their 
taking the second, “wide” road renders it unnecessary to redefi ne “omni-
science.” (Richard Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge and Free-Will Theism” in 
The Grace of God and the Will of Man, ed. Clark Pinnock, (Minneapolis, MN: 
Bethany House Publishers, 1989), pp. 128–30.) Open theists traveling the 
wide road may retain the common defi nition (always knowing all truths); as 
we’ll see, they need only say that divine omniscience has less content than 
traditionalists have assumed, and that this content changes as the cosmos 
changes. I’m unable to confi dently place some open theists in either camp. 
(e.g., Clark Pinnock, “God Limits His Knowledge” in Predestination and Free 
Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger 
and Randall Basinger, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986) pp. 150–
51; Donald H. Wacome, “Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom,” Review 
of the Evangelical Philosophical Association, pp. 12, 49–64, 1989.)
3. As Gregory Boyd points out, this characterization of open theism as 
denying that God has “comprehensive” foreknowledge, or denying that God is 
all-knowing, or att ributing ignorance of reality to God is obnoxiously question-
begging in reference to his (former) position, which I’ll discuss below as “the 
wide road.” (Gregory Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open 
View of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000), pp. 124–26, “A Response 
to John Piper,” www.biblical-theology.com/omniscience/piper.htm, “Brief Re-
sponses to Objections,” www.gregboyd.org/gbfront/index.asp?PageID=506, 
“Common Misconceptions on the Open View,” www.gregboyd.org/gbfront/
index.asp?PageID=503; cf. Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge,” p. 129) According 
to both wide road and shortcut open theism (explained in sections 3–5 below), 
there is never any truth which God fails to know. Boyd suggests the term “ex-
haustively defi nite foreknowledge” for the kind of knowledge open theists be-
lieve God lacks. (Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press), p. 86) Perhaps a clearer term 
would be: “temporally complete knowledge.” In any case, the conventional ex-
pression that open theists deny God “comprehensive” foreknowledge does fi t 
narrow road open theism, which holds that there are truths God doesn’t know, 
all of which traditionalists assert that he knows.
4. William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1989), p. 187. In a recent article he more concisely says, “Omni-
science . . . means that God knows everything that is logically capable of being 
known.” (“The foreknowledge problem,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, pp. 50, 97–114, 2001, see p. 111) Cf. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, 
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